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Abstracts 
 
 
 
Toward a Biregional Agenda far the Twenty-first Century 
 
In the wake of the 1999 Rio Summit and its focus on biregional 
cooperation, this article reviews the background and development of 
European-Latin American relations over the past two decades, the political 
and economic context, the current state of transatlantic links, and the short- 
term prospects far the relationship. Among its several premises is that the 
EU and Latin America constitute the bulk of the West, and the ways they 
work together will therefore condition the role of each of them on the 
international s t a g e . 
 
Trade, Politics, and Democratization: The 199 7 Global Agreement 
Between the European Union and Mexico 
 
Mexico and the European Union signed a new Political and Economic 
Association Agreement in December 1997 and ultimately a free-trade 
agreement in March 2000, aiming to establish a new model of relations with 
a more dynamic trade and investment component. This article analyzes the 
1997 agreement as background to the final accord. Economic and political 
changes in the 1990s modified both parties' participation in the 
international political economy, helping to overcome some of the 
structural obstacles to the relationship. The policy toward Latin America 
adopted by the EU in 1994 was influential. The negotiation process 
revealed divergences over the scope of the liberalization process and the 
so-called democracy c l a u s e . 
 
The European Union as a “Global Civilian Power”: Development 
Cooperation in EU-Latin American Relations 
 
	  2 
The European Union's attempts to strengthen ties with Latin America relate 
to a broader international strategy of demonstrating that it is a "global 
player" and attaining the image of a "civilian power." Yet many observers 
suspect that European aid is simply instrumental to trade and investment 
promotion and other interests. They question whether the EU's strong 
position as a donor in Latin America means that Latin America is strongly 
important to the EU. This article reviews the history, context, and latest 
trends in EU aid to Latin America, then looks at the prospects for a 
biregional partnership. 
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Mexico and the European U n i o n  s igned  a Political a n d  Economic 
Association Agreement on December 8, 1997, after two years of talks and 
a difficult negotiation process. The agreement provides for an 
institutionalized political dialogue based on mutual respect for democracy 
and human rights, creates a framework to negotiate the liberalization of 
trade in goods and services as well as investment flows, and calls for 
reinforced economic cooperation. The agreement may promote more 
dynamic trade and investment relations between Mexico and the EU, as the 
"association" proposed by the agreement constitutes an attempt to 
overcome the somewhat stagnant relations of the last 20 years. 
The traditional, asymmetrical relations were limited to the provision 
of European development assistance; even after signing the first 
coopera-tion agreement in 1975, both parties had only a  "dialogue of the 
deaf ' (Durán 1992, 14). It was not possible to deal with the sensitive 
issues or strategic interests at stake. For the then European Economic 
Community (EEC), relations were limited by Mexico's political situation and 
investment protection regime. 1 For Mexico, the main problems were trade 
barriers and access to the European market. 
With the various global, regional, national, and subnational changes 
in the 1990s, the position of both parties in the international political 
economy has shifted significantly. These shifts have helped them to 
overcome some of the structural obstacles in their relationship, and 
ultimately it led, for the first time, to an explicit commitment to democracy 
and reciprocal trade liberalization, the free-trade agreement signed on 
November 24, 1999, as this article was being prepared. The new 
agree-ment, ratified March 23, 2000 and slated to take effect July 1, 2000, 
covered all trade-related matters included in the global agreement. 
Globally, the most important transformations have been the process 
of economic globalization, competition for markets and capital flows, and 
the multilateral liberalization process led by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round Agreements and the World Trade 
Organization after 1994. Regionally, the most important changes were the 
establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement and, in the EU, 
enlargement and deepening.  The latter has  included  the  creation  of the 
European Monetary Union  (EMU) and a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and, within this framework, the launching of a new strategy 
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for relations with Latin America. In national and subnational dynamics, 
important features are the processes of liberalization and privatization 
initiated by the Mexican authorities, which accelerated after the peso crisis 
of December 1994. In the EU, they are the process of corporate 
internationalization and the member states' growing private and public 
orientation toward emerging markets, including those of Latin America. 
This article examines the significance of the 1997 agreement in light 
of these changes, assessing its potential for strengthening ties between the 
EU and Mexico. It analyzes the development of the relationship between 
1975 and 1995 with a special focus on trade, investment flows, and 
development assistance, as well as the evolving institutional framework. It 
examines EU policy toward Latin America after 1994, placing the 
relationship with Mexico in the wider context of the EU's strategic 
objectives in the region. It evaluates the negotiation process between the 
EU and Mexico, paying special attention to the disputes or divergences that 
emerged over the nature of the agreement, the scope of liberalization, and 
the inclusion of the so-called "democracy clause" guaranteeing democratic 
practices and observance of human rights. 
 
THE 1970s AND 1980s: AN ASYMMETRICAL, NON 
PREFERENTIAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
The first institutional contacts between the EEC and Mexico in the 1970s 
were the product of the Mexican government's active foreign policy and 
its aim to diversify foreign relations (Ojeda 1986; Arrieta 1996, 124). At the 
same time, incipient EEC development cooperation policy helped to 
institutionalize contacts with the signature of the so-called Framework 
Agreement on September 16, 1975, which remained in force for 15 years. 
This agreement's primary aim was to expand trade, as other similar "first 
generation" agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay between 1971 
and 1974 had done. It generated high expectations but amounted to 
nothing more than a "nonpreferential" agreement, whereby both parties 
gave one another Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. In practical terms, the 
agreement led only to trade promotion activities (Ashoff 1989, 61). The 
only mechanism for institutionalized dialogue it established was a Joint 
Commission of a technical nature. 
The agreement's limited impact was a consequence of Mexico's 
nationalistic development strategy and Third World foreign policy 
orientation and of the EEC's protectionism, which peaked in the 1970s. 
Thus Mexico's expectations of preferential access to the ECC market were 
thwarted, because the EEC was not prepared to reduce trade barriers or 
to abolish preferences conceded to the "associated" countries of Africa, the 
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). Mexican exports were subject to the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) established unilaterally by the 
EEC in 1971. At the same time, EEC hopes for greater access to Mexican 
natural resources, particularly petroleum, were dashed. The Mexican 
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authorities repeatedly called for the inclusion in the GSP of products that 
the Community considered sensitive and thereby subjected to quotas, 
tariffs, and other barriers. The Community did not agree to these petitions 
and, arguing that Mexico did not take full advantage of the GSP, the 
European Commission simply proposed meetings between entrepreneurs 
and training courses instituted to promote the "better use" of the GSP. It 
also extended economic cooperation to new fields, such as energy, science 
and technology, and tourism (Durán 1992, 12). 
The other aim of the agreement was to achieve "the highest and most 
balanced trade relation possible." Between 1975 and 1980, Mexican 
exports, dominated by petroleum, grew the most, but the country did not 
manage to eliminate its chronic trade deficit with the ECC until the 1980s. 
According to Mexico, EEC protection barriers were the main cause of the 
imbalance; but the limited diversification of Mexican exports and the anti- 
export bias of its development policy were also to blame. 
At the joint Commission meeting of 1979, both parties agreed that the 
aims of the agreement had not been met. Frustrated with the agreement's 
limited results, the Joint Commission did not meet for the next four years. 
When meetings resumed, in the early 1980s, Mexico's external vulnerability 
as a result of the debt crisis had created a climate of better mutual 
understanding.  This atmosphere favored a more pragmatic Mexican 
foreign policy position, while Mexico's participation in the Contadora 
Group to deal with the Central American crisis facilitated a political 
convergence with Europe. After 1981, furthermore, Mexico's trade balance 
with Europe grew positive, reaching a historie surplus of US$3.033 million 
in 1984. This favorable situation lasted until 1989, sustained not only by 
rising exports to Europe but by falling imports from the EEC as a result of 
the drastic adjustment measures adopted to confront the economic crisis. 
Another important change was the diversification of Mexican exports 
to the EEC. Between 1984 and 1989, the share of petroleum and 
petrochemicals fell from 85 percent to 49 percent, and exports of 
manufactured goods increased. In this context, Mexican demands for 
greater trade access lost force; more emphasis was placed on cooperation 
in energy, trade, investment promotion, and science and technology. 
Between 1979 and 1984, Community aid to Mexico was ECU$2.2 million, 
but between 1985 and 1989 it rose to ECU$33 million. The positive results 
of increased trade promotion and business cooperation programs, the 
creation of the Mexico-European Union Business Council, and the 
inauguration of a European Commission Representative Office in Mexico 
City were recognized at the 1989 Joint Commission meeting. It was also 
agreed that a new agreement was necessary to take account of the various 
new forms of cooperation that had been initiated since, but had not been 
contemplated by, the 1975 agreement. 
 
THE 1991 AGREEMENT:  "ADVANCED COOPERATION" 
The signing of a new Framework Agreement with Mexico was part of the 
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process of renovation of EEC development cooperation policy toward 
Latin America (Arenal 1993, 241). It was given added impetus by the 
liberalization policies initiated by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and 
European fears of losing market share as a result of NAFTA (Grabendorff 
1991). A new agreement also fit Mexico's new pragmatic foreign policy and 
liberalizing economic strategy. In the mid-1980s, the Mexican authorities 
initiated an ambitious program of unilateral trade liberalization within the 
framework of structural adjustment policies, trying to improve Mexico's 
global economic position. This policy could only succeed over the long 
term if Mexican exports gained access to new markets. 
The 1991 agreement expanded development assistance, but the 
political, trade, and investment realms changed barely at all. The new 
agreement was similar to the so-called third-generation agreements the 
EEC signed with most Latin American countries and subregions in the early 
1990s. These agreements included a democracy clause, or a commitment 
to the "democratic foundations of cooperation" (IRELA 1997, 13-15;Arenal 
1997, 123). Such a clause was not included in the agreement with Mexico, 
however. The Mexican government believed that this kind of clause 
constituted an unacceptable unilateral imposition, contrary to Mexico's 
noninterventionist constitutional foreign policy. The clause was also 
considered a threat to the delegitimized Mexican political system after the 
massive electoral fraud of 1989 (El País 1994). 
The agreement also failed to address other traditionally sensitive 
themes, such as the Mexican export access to the EEC. The Community was 
unable to persuade Mexico to abandon its traditional position regarding 
investment protection; the agreement called for actions to "improve the 
investment climate" established through national legislation and bilateral 
agreements, to which Mexico subscribed only after 1995. In terms of trade, 
the 1991 agreement was even more limited than its predecessor. Although 
it reaffirmed MFN Status, this clause had become redundant, as Mexico was 
by then a member of GATI (Sberro 1996, 230). Because the agreement was 
still "nonpreferential", furthermore, the GSP still applied to Mexican 
exports. The agreement provided for economic cooperation activities, 
including entrepreneurial meetings, trade fairs, information exchange, 
quality regulations, and cooperation in science and technology; yet it failed 
to include any commitment to the reduction or elimination of trade 
barriers.  In sum, the 1991 agreement  <lid not attempt to modify the 
structural conditions of trade relations. 
Mexico's foreign trade is characterized by a strong dependence on 
the United States, which, in 1995, received 83 percent of Mexico's exports 
and originated 74 percent of its imports. The EU has been Mexico's second- 
largest trade partner since 1994, with 11.5 percent of total imports and 4.5 
percent of exports. The Mexican market, however, ranked 20th in EU 
exports and 29th in imports. In 1994, Mexico absorbed 23 percent of the 
Latin American export market of the EEC, after Brazil, with 24 percent. 
Since 1995, the Mexico's participation has ranged between 13 
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percent and 16 percent because of the peso crisis. As a supplier of the EEC, 
Mexico has lagged even further behind. Between 1990 and 1994, Mexico 
was the origin of 10 percent of Community imports from Latin America, 
third after Brazil, with 35 percent, and Argentina, with 12 percent. As far 
as the structure of trade is concerned, over the last few years Mexican 
exports have become more diversified and the share of primary goods has 
diminished (Cervantes 1996, 181). The percentage of manufactured goods 
in total Mexican exports to the EEC surpassed 20 percent in 1986 and rose 
to 53 percent in 1993. Oil and natural gas exports shrank from 75 percent 
in 1975 to 23 percent in 1993. Community exports to Mexico have mainly 
consisted of high added-value products. Of the 54 percent in capital goods, 
23 percent are manufactured goods, 13percent are chemical products, and 7 
percent are processed food products. The automobile sector has had 
significant weight. In 1995, 10 percent of the imports and 9 percent of 
Mexican exports to the EU were cars, engines and car parts. The auto sector 
is characterized by the importance of interindustrial trade and of direct 
European investment. Hence, interfirm trade constitutes 39 percent of 
Mexican imports from of the EU (Chacón  1996, 180). 
After Mexico's economic recovery, trade asymmetries and the 
unbalanced pattem of exchanges increased. Between 1990 and 1995, EU 
exports to Mexico grew by 64 percent, from US$5.284 million to US$8.224 
million (see table 1). Mexican exports to the EU diminished during this 
period by 18 percent, from US$3.875 million to US$3.169 million. By 
contrast, Latin American exports to the EU, headed by the Southem 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), grew 19 percent. As a result, the Mexican 
deficit with the EU reached US$5.127 million in 1994, intensifying the 
balance-of-payment crisis that contributed to the December 1994 peso 
crisis. 
It is important to note that the financial crisis and the ensuing peso 
devaluation, which notably increased the competitiveness of Mexican 
exports, produced only short-term changes and <lid not alter the structural 
trade imbalances (Peréz Herrero 1997, 115-17; 1998, 13). Thus, although 
the deficit declined to US$1.690 million in 1995, in 1997 it had rose again 
 
 
Table l. EU-Mexico Trade, 1990-1997 (in US$ millions) 
 
 Exports to EU Imports from EU Balance 
1990 3.875 5.284 -1.409 
1991 3.776 6.401 -2.625 
1992 3.799 7.751 -3.952 
1993 2.934 7.190 -4.256 
1994 3.147 8.274 -5.127 
1995 4.059 5.749 -1.690 
1996 3.867 6.389 -2.522 
1997 4.355 8.284 -3.929 
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Note: Figures represent 15 member states. 
Source: IMF 1998. 
 
to almost US$4.000 million, and in the first ten months of 1998 it 
reached US$6.200 million (IRELA 1998b, 2). 
The sustained increase in trade should not obscure both partners' 
significant decline in market share. Between 1990 and 1997, the EU's share 
in Mexican exports fell from 13.3percent to 3.6 percent of the total. Imports 
fell during the same period from 17.4 percent to 9.0 percent. By contrast, 
as a direct result of NAFTA, the U.S. share in Mexican exports rose from 
69.3 percent to 85.6 percent, and from 66.1 percent to 74 percent in terms 
of imports, increasing Mexico's trade dependence on the United States. 
For Mexico, the unfavorable evolution of trade and the rising 
deficit with the EU were not only a product of trade diversion arising from 
NAFTA. Also important were the temporary and extraordinary trade 
preferences the EU granted to Andean Community and Central American 
competitors, trade barriers induced by the formation of the Single 
European Market (SEM), and particularly strict European quality 
regulations, which rein- forced traditional EEC protectionism (see 
Auboin and Laird 1997). Trade diversion caused by the new association 
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries and, above all, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe was also significant (Mujal-
León 1995, 153). 
Among the causes explaining the fast growth of EU exports to Mexico 
was the competitive position of European products, partly a result of 
devaluation caused by the 1992 and 1993 "monetary storms" in Europe. 
Also important were Mexico's unilateral trade liberalization and the growth 
of internal Mexican demand for finished goods, as well as for intermediate 
and capital goods because of NAFTA and an overvalued exchange rate 
(Chacón 1 9 9 6 ,  168-72). 
The relative importance of each one of these factors is difficult 
to determine, and the topic drew controversy during the negotiation of 
the 1997 agreement. The new GSP adopted in 1995, moreover, may 
have aggravated the situation. Under the new system, tariff preferences 
expire for certain products of the more advanced developing countries, 
so that the principle inspiring the reform (gradual preferences) 
penalizes the relatively more advanced developing countries. In 1994, 
Mexico was the eleventh world and third Latin American beneficiary 
of the GSP. (It is paradoxical that Mexico benefits from the GSP 
although it is an OECD member.) If trade is not liberalized between the 
two sides, steel and some Mexican agricultural products will be 
excluded from the benefits of the GSP in the short run, making access to 
the EU market even more difficult (Chacón 1996, 181-83; ALADI 1998, 
29-37). 
Mexico has been a traditional destination for European foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The dynamism of its economy in the 1960s and 1970s 
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and the size of its market favored a significant volume of such investment, 
despite the restrictions deriving from nationalist development p o l i c i e s . 
With the debt crisis, the flow of FDI declined, but liberalization after 1989 
attracted a significant part of new financial flows going to the "emerging 
markets" of Asia and Latin America (Gurría 1995a). Between 1990 and 
1995, Mexico received US$30.3 billion in FDI, which represents a third of 
that received by all of Latin America during this period (IRELA 1996, 48). 
In 1995, the Mexican Secretary of Trade and Industrial Development 
(SECOFI) registered 2,859 firms operating with EU capital, the equivalent 
of 23 percent of the 12,261 businesses established with foreign investment 
in Mexico. In 1,909 of these businesses, EU investors retained a majority 
of shares. 
The reform of the regulatory framework for foreign investment and 
the privatization program facilitated the return of European investment to 
Mexico. In 1989, the Salinas administration reformed the stricter 
dispositions of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973. In 1993, a new law 
eliminated most restrictions still in effect. Although sectors such as oil 
and gas, basic petrochemicals, electricity generation, and ports and 
airports were re- served for the state, others, like media, internal 
transport, and gas distribution, were either totally or partially reserved 
for national capital investment. The EU is the second source of FDI 
in Mexico, with an accumulated stock in 1995 of US$11.227 million, or 
20 percent of total FDI. The United States comes first with US$33.346 
million, or 59 percent of total FDI. 
Encouraged by more favorable conditions, EU FDI flows to Mexico 
between 1990 and 1995 tripled in comparison with the previous five-year 
period. Compared with Latin American regional free-trade areas, however, 
Mexico was not the first destination of EU FDI to Latin America, receiving 
only 15 percent of the total over the same period, in comparison to 49 
percent for MERCOSUR and 21 percent for the Andean Community (IRELA 
1996, 63).  
The peso crisis led to a temporary deterioration in the investment 
climate, and FDI flows fell in 1995 to 25 percent. As the crisis was gradually 
overcome, however, exports recovered. The peso crisis also helped to 
speed up structural reforms and privatization. The National Development 
Plan of 1995-2000 has provided for the privatization of airports, ports, and 
petrochemical plants. In "magnet" sectors for FDI, there was rapid 
deregulation (Economist 1995). Between 1995 and 1996, the Mexican 
Congress liberalized the long-distance telephone service, satellite 
communications, the railroads, and airport transportation, and allowed the 
private sector to build, operate, and own systems of transportation, 
storage, and distribution of natural gas. The privatization of secondary 
petrochemicals was also accelerated, opening new investment 
opportunities for foreign oil and chemical companies. 
NAFTA has provided an additional incentive for EU investors; with 
it Mexico has reinforced its role as an "export platform" to the larger U.S. 
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and Canadian markets. Expectations of market growth in Mexico and of 
exports to Mexico's NAFTA associates, as well as strict rules of origin 
established by NAFTA for key sectors of European FDI, such as 
automobiles, have promoted new investment flows from EU companies.2 
Mexico can also potentially become an export platform for other Latin 
American countries with which it has signed free trade agreements.  It is 
important to note, however, that NAFTA grants more favorable 
conditions to U.S. investors than to those of the EU. The new Foreign 
Investment Law codifies many of the guarantees included in NAFTA, but 
NAFTA provides additional guarantees for U.S. and Canadian FDI that 
are not available to EU competitors (Marshall 1996, 3). 
Given the long absence of a real dialogue on trade and investment, 
European Community aid was for a long time the key material expression 
of EU-Mexico relations. Aid levels, however, show that Mexico has not 
been a priority in this regard.3 Financial commitments with Mexico rose 
from ECU$32.2 million between 1985 and 1989 to $74.1 million between 
1990 and 1995. Despite the increase, Mexico's low participation in 
European assistance to Latin America did not change. Mexico received 3.2 
percent of commitments to the region between 1990 and 1996, far behind 
Central America and the Andean area, which are traditional priority areas. 
Cuba, the only country in the region with which the EU has not signed a 
cooperation agreement, has levels similar to Mexico's. Mexico's mere size 
indicates the inadequacy of assigned funds. In per capita terms, Mexico is 
the country that received the least assistance in 1990-95: 0.8 ECU per capita 
in contrast with 1.1 ECU for Brazil, 1.8 for Argentina, 8.7 for Chile, and the 
regional average of 5.5 ECU. 
From a qualitative point of view, however, cooperation with Mexico 
is a singular model in the Latin American context. It is a model of advanced 
economic cooperation based on the promotion of trade and investment, 
which responds to the demands of developing economies that are 
relatively more advanced and have a greater capacity for insertion in the 
global economy. This can be attributed partly to Mexico's efforts and the 
importance it has attached to private enterprise. Between 1990 and 1996, 
economic cooperation represented 69 percent of total cooperation flows, 
development assistance 23 percent, and environmental cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance 4 percent each (see European Commission 
Delegation in Mexico 1995). 
Economic cooperation has focused on promoting business 
opportunities in sectors of mutual interest, such as agribusiness, fishing, 
textiles, automobiles, tourism, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and furniture. It 
led to the creation in 1989 of the Mexico-European Union Council, 
composed of high-level Mexican and European entrepreneurs, and the 
establishment November 1993 of the Chambers of Commerce of the 
European Union in Mexico (EUROCAM). It has also led to the creation 
of the Cooperation Program on Norms and Certification, which attempts 
to improve the quality of Mexican exports and involves an active 
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participation of the private sector; and of a technical assistance program to 
promote Mexican exports to the EU. 
Investment promotion activities have been developed primarily by 
the European Community Investment Partners (ECIP) and AL-INVEST 
programs, while cooperation programs have been set up in the fields of 
science and technology as well as energy. Most international development 
assistance has been devoted to the Guatemalan refugees and to programs 
cofinanced with nongovernmental organizations, centering on areas of 
high social impact, such as the fight against poverty, agriculture and rural 
development, education, health, sanitation, and demographics. NGOs 
have also played an important role in environmental issues and in the 
distribution of humanitarian assistance, which began after the 1995 
uprising of the National Liberation Zapatista Army (EZLN) in the state of 
Chiapas. 
 
THE 1990s: NEW LIBERALIZATION STRATEGIES 
Despite progress in some areas after the 1991 agreement, by 1994 changes 
in the international system and in both regions had rendered those 
relationships, and the "third-generation" agreements in particular, obsolete 
(Arenal 1996; IRELA 1997, 151-54; Purcell and Simon 1995, 39-49). At the 
beginning of 1994, the EU presented Latin America with the possibility of 
trade liberalization for the first time, through diplomatic initiatives by some 
member states, European Commission proposals, and a formal proposal by 
the European Parliament in April (European Parliament 1994). The most 
important changes leading to this shift were the culmination of the GATT 
Uruguay Round, the reactivation of regional integration processes in Latin 
America, the development of the CFSP, the completion of SEM, and the 
establishment of a common currency in Europe, as well as changes in trade 
and investment flows between both regions (Sotillo 1992; Arenal 1993; 
Klaveren 1994; Aldecoa 1995; Purcell and Simon 1995). 
The GATT Uruguay Round agreements of 1994, which constitute an 
ambitious liberalization calendar for 1995-2010, have important 
implications for relations between the EU and Latin America. The 
agreements clear up uncertainty prevalent in the 1980s and early 1990s 
about the future of the international trade system. It now seems clear that 
regionalism and multilateralism are complimentary and not mutually 
exclusive strategies. As a result, national strategies have been readjusted 
to ensure favorable positions in the global economy, such as adopting 
subregional liberalization a g r e e m e n t s . 
One of the effects of multilateral liberalization has been to reduce the 
ACP countries' preference within the EU's preference hierarchy. Thus, 
liberalization has reduced the costs of extending preferences to other 
countries or areas such as Latin America. The growth of exports and the 
large European trade surplus has also reduced the cost of an eventual 
liberalization. This may be counteracted, however, by trade diversion 
effects caused by the integration processes in the MERCOSUR and Chile 
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as well as in Mexico within NAFTA, leading to a reduction of market quotas 
for the EU. In addition, European investors will receive less favorable 
treatment compared with third parties such as the United States, which 
wants to establish by 2005 a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) to 
include the entire region. For the European Commission, this constitutes 
one of the main arguments for proposing the establishment of a new 
generation of agreements with Latin America (European Commission 
1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). The EU's new policy for Latin America can 
therefore be considered a strategic response to the FTAA. For Latin 
America, the European option is also strategically valuable.  It represents a 
diversifying option and gives the countries of the region a counterweight 
against the strong influence of the United States, thus widening the margin 
of negotiation within the FTAA. 
The renovation process of EU-Latin American relations was initiated 
in 1994 (Marín 1994). In the document outlining the new strategy, the EU 
points out that "the development of trade and investment will continue to 
be the cornerstone in the relations with our associates of Latin America and 
the Caribbean" (Council of the European Union 1994, point 9). It proposes 
strengthening political dialogue based on a mutual commitment to 
democracy and human rights, and the establishment of more diversified 
cooperation relations that can respond to the region's varying needs. 
The aim is to establish an "association" based on the third-generation 
agreements already in force, as well as to establish free trade agreements 
with the most dynamic subregions and countries, known as "fourth-
generation agreements." Hence the call by the European Council in 
December 1994 for the European Commission to initiate negotiations with 
Mexico and Chile. The fourth-generation agreements are based on the 
principles of reciprocity and common interest. They attempt to establish 
a political and economic association that has an "interregional" character, 
in the case of MERCOSUR. Relations are based on the democracy clause, 
and focus on three basic elements: an institutionalized political dialogue, 
a gradual and reciprocal liberalization of trade and investment, and 
advanced economic cooperation. These are "framework agreements" 
insofar as they do not provide for liberalization in themselves, but instead 
establish guidelines for the gradual development of trade relations through 
subsequent negotiations. 
The agreements institute regular political dialogue at different levels: 
between heads of state, ministers, government officials, and members of 
parliaments. The dialogue is meant to cover issues of common interest of 
a bilateral nature, as well as global matters. It aims to allow the EU and its 
various interlocutors in Latin America to harmonize positions within the 
framework of the CFSP. Advanced economic cooperation applies to those 
areas already covered by the third-generation agreements, especially 
regarding business cooperation, increasing investment, transportation, 
energy, telecommunications, the environment, and science and 
technology. In the case of MERCOSUR, cooperation for regional 
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integration is also included. 
The gradual and reciprocal liberalization of exchanges to foment the 
growth and diversification of trade is to be carried out in accordance with 
WTO rules, keeping in mind the sensitivity of certain products. Thus, for 
the first time, there is a possibility of an opening that surpasses the GSP 
or the temporary and extraordinary tariff preferences accorded to the 
Andean and Central American countries. Although there are no concrete 
commitments with regard to the scope and calendar of liberalization, the 
possibility of starting negotiations has raised high expectations in Latín 
America. At the same time, the absence of concrete plans permits the EU 
to avoid discussing sensitive sectors, such as services and investment, 
which require agreement among all 15 EU member states.4 
During the second half of 1995, while Spain held the EU presidency, 
the pursuit of these agreements was given renewed ímpetus. The EU- 
MERCOSUR Framework Agreement was the most visible result of these 
efforts. Signed in December 1995, it established an "association" based on 
political dialogue and the liberalization of trade with the aim of creating 
a biregional free trade area by the year 2005, in accordance with WTO 
norms, and a strategy favoring "open regionalism" (European Council 
1996a). The next agreement of this kind was signed with Chile in June 1996 
(European Council 1996b). The Mexican agreement of 1997, however, 
includes specific commitments for trade liberalization; thus it differs 
significantly from the preceding two and can be considered a "fifth- 
generation" agreement. The importance of trade, investment, and economic 
interests in the EU-Mexico agreement contrasts openly with the renovation 
in 1996 of EU policy toward the Andean Community and the Central 
American Countries contrasts openly with the renovation in 1996 of EU 
policy toward the Andean Community and the Central American 
Countries. This policy was limited to political dialogue, a nonpreferential 
trade regime, and development aid, all in the framework of the obsolete 
"third-generation" agreements granted to both regions in preceding years. 
In brief, a new "selective strategy" toward individual countries and 
subregions has emerged in the EU-Latin America relationship (Torres-
Rivas  1994, 98-99; Sanahuja  1996, 13-15). 
 
THE NEED FOR A NEW AGREEMENT 
The financia! crisis of December 1994 strengthened Mexico's traditional 
position as "a country of multiple memberships that requires selective and 
flexible alliances" (Chen 1996, 152) in arder to diversify its external links. 
Although it pursued the NAFTA negotiations, Mexico did not renounce 
diversification; it is negotiating liberalization agreements with Colombia 
and Venezuela, associates of the "Group of Three"; and with Chile, Bolivia, 
Central America, and members of the Association of Caribbean States. 
The diversification strategy is part of the National Development Plan 
1995-2000 and the Industrial and Foreign Trade Policy Program of SECOFI. 
According to the latter, foreign trade negotiations are essential to diversify 
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exports, attain a 20 percent rate of annual growth in exports, and raise 
foreign investment. This policy aims to achieve reciprocity of market 
access, but through a gradual opening on the part of Mexico (SECOFI 1996, 
491). According to Finance Secretary José  Angel Gurría, the trade 
agreement with the EU is a top priority far diversification and the 
establishment of a counterweight to U.S. trade influence. In his view, the 
Pacific Basin is still not a tangible alternative, and Latin America is more of 
a competitor than a source of diversification (Gurría  1995b, 295). 
Conditions of reciprocity are especially important in the European 
case because of Mexico's unilateral liberalization since the mid-1980s, 
which, according to the Mexican authorities, has given European exporters 
an unfair advantage (Santamaría 1996). Reciprocity of access would ease 
and neutralize the negative effects of trade barriers arising from the SEM, 
the growing competition from Eastern Europe,  and the new GSP. 
The Mexican ambassador to the EU, Manuel Armendáriz, noted that 
the Mexican government hoped to "sign a true free trade agreement with 
the European Union, whose economic and trade dimensions would entail 
much more than the third generation agreement signed in 1991" (Excelsior 
1996b). The new agreement should establish a precise calendar of 
liberalization, immediate in some areas and gradual in others, recognizing 
existing asymmetries and Mexico's unfavorable position. Mexican negotia- 
tors felt that a fourth-generation agreement like those signed with Chile 
and MERCOSUR in 1995 and 1996 lacked a concrete commitment to trade 
liberalization. As a result, the "only tangible result" of signing such an 
agreement would be granting economic assistance and delaying "the 
process toward a true free trade agreement" (González Bejarle  1996). 
For the EU, Mexico represents a market of almost 90 million 
consumers. It is an important trade associate and, above all, an export 
"platform" to the U.S. and Canadian markets. According to Mexican 
estimates, trade liberalization with Mexico would allow for an increase of 
around US$5 billion in EU exports to NAFTA. The EU also believes that a 
new agreement would allow it to retain its market share and consolidate 
its position in Mexico, thus confronting trade diversion caused by NAFTA 
(European Commission 1995a, 12). Mexico is immersed in various 
liberalization schemes with other countries of Latin America, and will be 
a key associate in the FTAA, which can accentuate trade diversion effects. 
A poll published in 1995 by the European Commission Delegation in 
Mexico revealed that European companies in Mexico in fields such as 
telecommunications, automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, 
and footwear felt that their competitive position would be adversely 
affected by NAFTA  (European Commission Delegation 1995, 11-13). 
The EU also worries about the unfavorable position in which, 
without an agreement, its companies would operate compared with 
NAFTA-origin companies in fields such as telecommunications, financial 
services, insurance, and investment. The investment regime is especially 
important considering Mexico's ambitious program of privatization. The 
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EU and its member states perceive that a new agreement could contribute 
to an improvement in both areas. 
On investment issues, Mexico's traditional position is changing. At 
least this is what the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investment 
Agreements indicates, which Mexico signed with Spain and Switzerland in 
1995. In addition, there are ongoing bilateral negotiations with Germany, 
Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands for new 
agreements of this kind. Mexico's participation, as a member of the OECD, 
in the negotiation of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) also 
indicates that its investment policy will change. 
NAFTA, moreover, makes no distinction between companies of its 
members in terms of public contracts, which results in disadvantages for 
EU suppliers of services. With regard to intellectual property rights, 
NAFTA's protection regime is superior to that of the WTO. Thus there is 
a risk that Mexican trade protection will increase, as the tariffs that Mexico 
imposes on EU exports are inferior to those agreed on within the WTO. 
Finally, the EU wanted to sign a fourth-generation agreement and not a full 
free trade agreement because the former would permit the establishment 
of liberalization calendars at a later stage, as well as the creation of 
exclusion lists for sensitive products, thus making the agreement politically 
feasible. 
 
NEGOTIATING THE 1997 AGREEMENT: 
THE DEMOCRACY CLAUSE 
 
In May 1995 the European Council, the European Commission, and the 
Mexican government signed a Joint Solemn Declaration establishing the 
three pillars of a future agreement. First, it called for a reinforced, high-level 
political dialogue. Second, a framework for investment and trade in goods 
and services, including gradual and reciprocal liberalization according to 
WTO rules, bearing in mind the sensitive nature of certain products. 
Finally, it called for the intensification of economic cooperation. The 
declaration served to assure the respective markets and demonstrate EU 
commitment to the Mexican economy in the wake of the peso crisis (El País 
1996). 
EU member states differed, however, regarding the scope and 
content of trade liberalization and the agreement itself. At the Council of 
Ministers of General Issues in February 1996, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, with the support of Sweden and Luxembourg, favored an 
agreement leading to a free trade area through a "single-phase" negotiating 
process. France, Portugal, and Austria were opposed to free trade and a 
possibly indiscriminate liberalization process and proposed deferring this 
through a "two-phase" negotiation similar to that used with MERCOSUR. 
France claimed that free trade, particularly in the agriculture and livestock 
sector, could hurt the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and preferences 
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granted to the ACP countries. French resistance also stemmed from fears 
that the agreement with Mexico would serve as a model for future 
agreements and would open up the agricultural and livestock sector-not 
sensitive in the Mexican case, but certainly in the case of MERCOSUR or 
South Africa (Europe Information Bulletin 1996a). The Italian presidency 
of the EU failed to reach an agreement or an intermediate solution, and the 
negotiation guidelines returned without approval to the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives of the Member States (COREPER) for 
reconsideration. 
In April 1995, the European Commission made public a study that 
revealed that the sensitive products for the EU and its associates would 
affect only between 1O and 11percent of total Mexican exports and could 
be excluded from the agreement without breaking the WTO rules. In June 
1995, following an impasse provoked by the British veto over the "mad 
cow" disease crisis, the Council of Ministers agreed to the definite 
guidelines for negotiation. Negotiations were to be carried out on a sector- 
by-sector basis and had to involve both the member states and the 
Commission, as services fall under the jurisdiction of the member states 
and decisions require unanimity, while those concerning trade in goods 
require only a qualified majority and can be taken by the Commission. 
Because Mexico had signed various free trade agreements, the Committee 
also had to deal with rules of origin. The Council of General Issues, meeting 
in May 1996, ultimately arrived at a compromise on the negotiation 
guidelines. Given the resistance of Denmark, France, Holland, and 
Portugal, the goal was a gradual and reciprocal liberalization, slower than 
that initially proposed by Spain and the United Kingdom (Europe 
Information Bulletin  1996b; Miguel  and Montalbán  1996b). 
Visible divergences between Mexico and the EU also emerged at a 
technical meeting in October 1996 regarding the negotiation method, the 
content of trade liberalization, and the democracy clause. Regarding the 
negotiation method and the content of the agreement, Mexico preferred 
a "global and simultaneous" process covering the three areas (political 
dialogue, trade liberalization and economic cooperation), undertaken by 
a joint committee. The European Commission, on the other hand, wanted 
to negotiate economic cooperation and an institutional framework first 
and, in a second round, trade liberalization. In effect, the EU was proposing 
an agreement similar to those signed with MERCOSUR and Chile, but the 
Mexican delegation claimed that the Solemn Declaration provided for an 
immediate free trade negotiation that differed from the so-called fourth- 
generation agreements (Armendáriz 1997). The Commission accused 
Mexico of advocating the NAFTA model and warned that trade liberaliza- 
tion would require a long and difficult negotiation, given European 
preoccupations with the single currency, enlargement to the east, and the 
reform of key EU policies. Thus, in the Commission's view, the most viable 
option would be to sign a framework agreement rapidly and later focus on 
trade liberalization (El Economista 1996). 
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The democracy clause had already constituted an obstacle to the 
1991 agreement. Again in 1995, the initial Mexican position, which had 
wide domestic support, considered the clause a "unilateral imposition" and 
an "unacceptable condition." This attitude was especially strong among the 
more conservative sectors of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
and the government. An editorial in the Mexican daily Excelsior of 
October 14, 1996, declared that the democracy clause was "humiliating" 
and typical of "a relationship of domination" also exemplified by the 
Helms-Burton Law (Excelsior 1996a). 
Mexico's rejection of cooperation in the realm of democratization 
and human rights promotion revealed its extreme sensitivity to the issue. 
In 1996 the Mexican representative in Brussels succeeded in keeping the 
European Commission from cofínancing a US$320,000 project, Services for 
Peace 1997-1997, promoted by the National Mediation Commission 
(CONAI) to facilitate a dialogue between the government and the EZLN 
(Proceso 1996). In January 1997, Mexico tried to block final approval of 
EU financing of electoral observers from the Mexican Academy of 
Human Rights (AMDH), an independent NGO that had already received 
Community funding. According to Mexico, the Commission had not 
undertaken the pertinent consultations and the 1991 agreement did not 
extend to the political arena, such that the grant constituted "an 
unacceptable interference" in internal Mexican affairs (Proceso 1997a, b). 
The deeper question at stake, however, which even the Mexican 
government recognized, was how to handle the debate about the 
democracy clause.5 
For the EU it was important that the new association with Mexico be 
based explicitly on democratic principles, respect for the rule of law, and 
human rights. In 1991, the position of the then EEC had been different, as 
development policy and the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) 
had not evolved to the same extent (Barahona de Brito 1996). Between 
1992 and 1995, the democratic base of cooperation had acquired a solid 
legal foundation. New EC rules about economic assistance to developing 
countries, passed in 1992, include an express commitment to "democratic 
conditionality" (European Council 1992). Meanwhile, the Treaty of the 
European Union, in force since November 1993, makes the promotion of 
democracy one of the three main objectives of EU development policy (see 
article 130U). 
In May 1995 the Council of Ministers of General Issues stated that all 
EU agreements should include standard democracy clauses in accordance 
with a proposal of the European Commission of May of the same year 
(European Commission 1995e). The proposal states that the clauses must 
be accompanied by an "application clause," whereby one party has to 
consult the other before adopting punitive measures, but that in cases of 
"special urgency" one side can adopt unilateral measures without previous 
consultation (Moreno 1996, 32). The legitimacy crisis of the Mexican 
political system, continued human rights violations, and the situation of 
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impunity in Mexico made this clause highly problematic. The European 
Parliament, on which the final approval of the agreement depends, has 
shown a special concern with these problems. The EP deems that 
economic liberalization has not been accompanied by democratization of 
state structures or a more equal distribution of wealth  and economic 
power, nor has it reduced the dynamics of exclusion and poverty that affect 
a large part of the population. For the EP, the inclusion of this clause was 
nonnegotiable, and the agreement had to be conditioned by its strict 
observance (European Parliament 1995, 1998, 1999; Proceso 1996b). 
In November 1996 Mexico proposed a "two-phase" negotiation and 
accepted the inclusion of the democracy clause, but insisted that the 
clause's reciprocal character should be explicitly recognized and rejected 
any "unacceptable unilateral supervision.” It stated, furthermore, that 
the clause should be worded differently from the standard clause and 
should be negotiated before, or simultaneously with, a trade agreement 
(Proceso 1996c; Excelsior 1997b). In April 1996 a compromise was 
reached. Mexico formally accepted the democracy clause according to 
the formula used in other agreements, which states that respect for 
democratic principles and fundamental rights as enunciated in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights should inspire the domestic 
and international policies of both parties and constitute an essential 
element of the agreement. Mexico, however, managed to delete the 
reference to domestic policies and, with European Commission 
negotiators' agreement, replace it with a unilateral Mexican declaration 
enunciating the constitutional principles governing foreign policy, 
including nonintervention. 
In April 1997the Council of Ministers approved a negotiation method 
that, without deviating from guidelines already approved, included part of 
Mexico's proposals. Negotiations took place between that date and June 
11, when, after a 48-hour marathon, both sides reached a final agreement 
outlined in three interrelated documents. The first was the Agreement on 
Economic and Political Association and Cooperation, also known as the 
Global Agreement. It included the democracy clause and established an 
institutional framework for political dialogue. It stated that both parties 
aimed toward "bilateral and preferential, gradual and reciprocal 
liberalization of trade of goods and services, in conformity with WTO 
norms and taking into account the sensitivity of certain products and 
service sectors." This transcended the fourth-generation agreements 
signed with Chile and MERCOSUR, which aimed only to "foment the 
increase and diversification of trade and to prepare their ulterior progressive 
and reciprocal liberalization" and did not include a calendar for 
liberalization. The agreement with Mexico established a Joint Council 
integrated by the European Commission, the EU member states, and 
Mexico that would decide the calendar and content of the liberalization 
of trade  in goods and services, the movement of capital and payments, 
and the opening of public procurement markets. The Joint Council could 
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also decide on competition policy and intellectual property rights. It is 
important to note that these decisions are interrelated and will take effect 
as soon as they are agreed to. 
Where cooperation is concerned, the agreement is wider-ranging 
and more systematic than that of 1991, including new areas, such as the 
fight against drugs (on which they had also signed an agreement in 
October 1996), democratization and human rights, and joint EU-Mexico 
cooperation with Central America. The agreement also includes a "national 
security clause," which is a novelty. It states that none of the dispositions 
of the agreement can become an obstacle to decisions that both parties 
consider essential to guarantee security in the event of international 
conflict or grave domestic disturbances, or to enabling them to avoid the 
diffusion of information contrary to their essential interests. In addition, the 
clause <loes not include trade liberalization in the defense sector. Further, 
the Global Agreement states that the framework for political dialogue and 
cooperation will remain suspended until decisions on liberalization are 
finalized. In this way, it ensures that a final agreement will take effect only 
with all its parts fully operational. 
The second document, the Interim Agreement Concerning Trade and 
Trade Related Issues, allows for the immediate establishment of the Joint 
Council and the immediate start of negotiations in areas under EU 
competence, notably goods. The Interim Agreement is applicable when 
the Global Agreement enters into force. It is also a novelty in EU-Latin 
American relations and was presented as a form of "fast-track" negotiation 
(Europe Information Bulletin l997b). Finally, the Joint Declaration on 
Services and Intellectual Property Matters establishes the terms of 
negotiation in areas under the competence of the member states. 
At a June 1997 meeting of COREPER, which meets before the 
Council of Ministers convenes, the democracy clause again caused 
controversy. The final text of the Global Agreement was questioned by 
all member states except Denmark, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
The dissenting group, headed by France, charged that the inclusion of a 
modified version of the democracy clause violated negotiation guidelines 
approved by the Council. The "exceptional treatment" accorded Mexico 
was rejected and the authority of the European Commission challenged. 
The vice president of the Commission criticized the "double standard" of 
sorne member states (a clear reference to France) that demanded of 
Mexico criteria they neglected to mention in cases such as China (Europe 
Information Bulletín 1997a). For the Mexican delegation, these were 
"dilatory tactics" that aimed to conceal the resistance of member states like 
France to trade liberalization (Excelsior 1997c). 
To speed up the approval of the agreement by the EU institutions, 
Mexico made additional concessions and accepted the complete democ- 
racy clause, including the reference to "domestic policies," but maintained 
the unilateral declaration referring to the principles governing its relations 
with other states. It also made concessions regarding the liberalization of 
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maritime transportation demanded by Greece and Denmark. It further 
conceded the "standstill clause,'' which sets the date for the application of 
tariff cuts. 
The fraud-free election of July 6, 1997, when the PRI lost its majority 
in Congress and the opposition PRD gained control of the capital, helped 
to dissolve the last EU hesitations, and the three agreements were finally 
signed in December 1997. Five negotiating rounds took place until ]une 
1998, and important advances occurred despite the unilateral rise in 
Mexican tariffs, from 3 percent to 10 percent, after January 1998. The main 
discrepancies were over rules of origin and market access. The EU 
demanded free, immediate access for 82 percent of trade, with the gradual 
liberalization of the remaining 18percent until the year 2003, when NAFTA 
parity should be reached. Mexico offered to liberalize 47 percent of trade 
immediately and 53 percent in three successive stages until full 
liberalization by the year 2007, alleging that the Mexican private sector 
resisted a too-rapid liberalization (El País Negocios 1999). 
The rapid evolution of the negotiations with Mexico contrasts with 
those of MERCOSUR and Chile. In July 1998 the European Commission 
passed negotiation guidelines for those talks after heated debate and with 
the opposition of the Commission's agriculture commissioner, who 
claimed that opening the EU market to MERCOSUR and Chilean 
agricultural goods, particularly cattle, wine, and cereals, would imply 
annual spending of 5,700 to 14,300 million euros, about one-third of the 
EU's total agricultural budget. The Commission's vice president, 
however, a strong supporter of the MERCOSUR and Chile 
agreements, presented other studies showing that only 14 percent of 
MERCOSUR exports were agricultural goods that were "sensitive" for 
the EU. He also noted that the costs of the agreements would be widely 
offset by the increase in EU exports in high added-value items, such as 
cars, chemicals, services, and high technology products. 
Until late]une 1999, negotiations were blocked within COREPER by 
strong resistance  from a group of member states, once again  headed by 
France. MERCOSUR stated that it would not participate in any negotiation 
if the agricultural sector were not included. For MERCOSUR, agriculture is 
essential; it is the sector most affected by EU trade barriers and the only 
one that can balance trade relations and reduce the large trade deficit with 
EU, which in 1997 rose to US$7.250 million. Just before the EU-Latin 
American and Caribbean Summit in June 1999, the Council approved a 
negotiating mandate for trade liberalization with these countries. It is not 
yet clear, however, how this process will progress. Some observers see it 
as an imminently political move, designed to present some concrete action 
at the summit. How the issue of agriculture will be resolved is likewise still 
unclear. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
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Europe and Mexico attempted unsuccessfully to deal with trade and 
investment and democratization for two decades. The impediments were 
largely structural factors derived from the North-South relationship and 
constraints in foreign, trade, and development policies. Mexico was part 
of the limited, traditional, and asymmetrical model of relationship that the 
EEC/EU established with other "non-associated" countries in Asia and Latin 
America. For almost two decades, too, the EEC/EU resisted changing its 
hierarchy of trade preferences and development policy. Mexico thus 
maintained its low ranking, and various trade barriers affected its exports. 
At the same time, European access to natural resources and FDI reform 
remained taboo subjects in Mexico until the late 1980s, given the country's 
nationalist foreign policy and development strategy. 
Political dialogue was similarly limited. Even when a strong 
convergence was evident, such as over Central America and Cuba, 
Europe's emphasis on democratizing the Mexican political system caused 
disputes and curbed the political agenda. Divergences in this area were 
accentuated in the late 1980s and early 1990s with Mexico's massive 
electoral fraud in 1989, the Zapatista revolt, and the social crisis that 
accompanied liberal- ization and adjustment. The Mexican authorities 
justified their defensive attitude with the principle of nonintervention, but 
in the real cause was the weakening of the PRI and the growing 
perception of vulnerability in the face of internal and external 
democratic pressures. 
The agreements of 1975 and 1991 were caught up in these difficulties. 
Although they were "non-preferential" and centered on development 
cooperation and foreign aid, Mexico wanted the elimination of trade 
barriers. The EEC/EU response was that the problem was not European 
protectionism but the lack of diversification of Mexican exports and 
Mexico's lack of knowledge about  and adaptation to the norms and 
requirements of the European market. This position allowed the EEC/EU 
to avoid the demands of liberalization and to center on trade promotion 
activities, such as trade meetings, fairs, and training courses, activities with 
relatively low costs. Both visions, however, are partially correct. Rather 
than being mutually exclusive, they are complimentary. In the end, 
however, as might be expected in an asymmetrical relationship, the 
European point of view prevailed. 
The new Framework Agreement signed in December 1997 appears 
to mark a break with the model in place since 1975. It calls for a new 
relationship, including the bilateral gradual and reciprocal liberalization of 
trade and investment, an institutionalized political dialogue, and a mutual 
commitment to democracy and human rights. This represents an important 
change. It seems that the main divergences impeding the deepening of 
political and economic relations have been put aside. The profound 
transformations that have taken place over the last few years in the 
international arena, as well as in the EU and Mexico, have allowed both 
sides to overcome the historical problems of EU protectionism, Mexican 
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investment rules, and Mexico's defensive political  attitude. 
Although the agreement is a new departure, however, it is only a 
starting point. It defines the principles and terms of political dialogue and 
the modalities and objectives of trade negotiation. The efficacy of the 
democratic clause, the real scope of trade liberalization, and, more 
generally, the utility of the agreement as an instrument for economic and 
social development and the consolidation of Mexican democracy depend 
on future negotiations and the scope and intensity of future political 
dialogue. Mexico <lid not get the immediate and global free trade 
agreement it hoped for; but the text signed in December 1997 transcends 
a fourth-generation agreement like those signed with Chile and the 
MERCOSUR in the nature of the commitments made, the sectors covered, 
the extensive decision making capacities given to the Joint Council in 
liberalization matters, and the dispositions that expressly tie together the 
three pillars of the agreement: economic cooperation, political dialogue, 
and trade and investment liberalization. 
The negotiation process also revealed existing divergences in the EU 
with respect to the scope of liberalization. Trade in services implies a 
complex and difficult negotiation among the 15 member states which has 
no precedent. The Mexican case is not unique in this respect. Similar 
difficulties have emerged in relations with other regions and countries, 
because the EU has still not defined a coherent global policy far extemal 
trade liberalization. To what point can concessions be made without 
incurring too high an economic  and political cost? Defining a coherent 
policy implies revising the relative position of Eastern Europe, the 
Mediterranean, the ACP countries, and Latin America in the hierarchy of 
EU preferences, which directly affects the national interests and fareign 
policy priorities of member states like France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain. Despite the difficulties, the EU will be forced  to 
address this question if it wishes to conduct trade negotiations with 
credibility and efficacy. 
Finally, the debate about the democracy clause and its application 
has only just begun. The fareseeable advances and setbacks of the Mexican 
democratization process, the frequent violations of human rights, and 
Mexico's impunity far such violations indicate that this clause may yet 
cause problems. lt is possible that the new national security clause will 
become an obstacle far the application of the democracy clause or lessen 
its efficacy. Other factors can debilitate its credibility and impact. As seen 
during the negotiation process, the clause could be invoked by sorne 
member states to safeguard trade interests. The self-interested use of the 
dause would have an effect contrary to intentions and could hamper rather 
than support Mexican democratization. 
The negotiation process revealed that the EU and Mexico have 
different visions about the kind of relationship they want to establish. 
Mexico wants free trade above all and resents political "interference." The 
EU wants a relationship with a strong political and social dimension. 
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Neither side won completely. In this sense, a more balanced model seems 
to be in place, with a democratic content and sorne social and political 
counterweights. Trade liberalization is not sufficient to promote social 
progress and the consolidation of democracy. The EU's relationship with 
Mexico, and indeed with the other countries of Latín America, cannot be 
limited to liberalization or guided simply by a desire to gain market quotas 
in a global economy. The economic and political confücts that took place 
in Mexico between 1994 and 1998 showed the limits of economic 
liberalization according to the "Washington Consensus." EU-Mexican 
relations must therefore work to achieve more than this. 
Political dialogue and an  effective democracy clause must be an 
essential component of the new model for relations. They should be 
applied in a reciprocal manner and without double standards or self- 
interested exceptions to safeguard powerful economic interests. Other- wise 
there is a risk that the new model of relations with Mexico will be 
nothing more than a European version of NAFTA tempered by democratic 
and social rhetoric, as well as development assistance and NGO action. 
This would weaken the credibility of CFSP, which links the legitimate 
economic interests of the EU with democracy, human rights, and social 
progress. In sum, a new relationship must do justice to the ideals that 
guided the process of integration  in Europe. 
 
POSTSCRIPT, MARCH 2000 
On November 24, 1999, the trade talks started under the interim agreement 
a year before were concluded, reaching an agreement to establish an EU- 
Mexico free trade area. This agreement was officially signed in March 24, 
2000, at the Lisbon Summit of the European Council. The Lisbon 
Declaration about the new EU-Mexico Association, adopted in this 
meeting by the Mexican president, the EU heads of state and government, 
and the European Commission, calls for a short ratification process so as 
to initiate the transition to an EU-Mexico free trade area as early as July 1, 
2000. 
According to the European Commissioner on Trade, Pascal Lamy, the 
new free trade agreement can be considered the widest ever negotiated 
between the European Union and any third country outside Europe, with 
the sole exception of Israel. It can also be considered a device to balance 
the strong influence of the United States in the Mexican economy, to 
restore the traditional market share of European Union exports in Mexico, 
and to create a better environment for the European Union foreign direct 
investment ( El País 1999). 
This pact is also remarkable for the unprecedented speed of the 
negotiation process and the scope of the liberalization. In industrial goods, 
Mexico has achieved immediate duty-free access to the European market 
for 80 percent of its exports, and the remaining 20 percent will be fully 
liberalized between 2003 and 2007. The European Union will have 
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immediate duty-free access for 60 percent of its exports, and Mexico will 
gradually cut its tariffs for the remaining 40 percent from 2003 to 2007. 
Norms of origin -a difficult issue in the trade talks- have been defined 
on a case-by-case basis. In agriculture, zero-tariff access will prevail, 
except for a list of sensitive products. A review of the agricultural section 
of the agreement will take place in 2003. The agreement also provides 
for a gradual liberalization in services and public procurement beyond 
the scope of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The liberalization will be completed  in ten years, and the EU companies 
will enjoy the same conditions as their NAFTA competitors. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
l. This position is based on the so-called Calvo Doctrine of 1868, in which 
the state cannot accept responsibilities for losses caused to foreigners. This doctrine 
is expressed in Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution. 
2. A paradigmatic case is that of Volkswagen, established in Mexico in 1962, 
which continued supplying the Mexican market with already  obsolete  models 
while producing a new "Beetle" for the U.S. market, both in its factories in Puebla. 
This factory's enlarged production capacity attracted suppliers like Saint Gobain, 
the manufacturer of security glass, which has obtained a loan from the European 
Investment Bank to build a plant in Mexico. BMW and Mercedes Benz also 
announced new investments in Mexico to expand their presence in the U.S. market. 
3. This refers only to Community aid and not to assistance channeled 
bilaterally by member states. 
4. Sentence 1/94 of November 15, 1994, of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, in reference to the agreements of GATT, considers that in 
accordance with Article 113 of the Treaty of the European Community,  the 
Community can conclude international treaties which encompass the trade of 
goods, but not the trade of services or the intellectual property rights related to 
trade. Given that these fourth-generation agreements encompass these questions 
and extend to CFSP and intergovernmental cooperation, the negotiations have to 
be conducted jointly by the Commission and the 15 member states in their 
respective areas of competence. 
5. The Federal Electoral Institute issued a resolution recalling that electoral 
monitoring with external funds does not contradict the Mexican Constitution and 
favors the transparency of elections. Mexico's final proposal was to channel the 
grant through governmental institutions. See La Jornada 1997; Excelsior 1997a; 
Proceso 1997c. 
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